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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
NOTE
STATUS OF SERVICE FREE CONTRACTS
IN PENNSYLVANIA
A public utility files a petition with the Pennsylvania Public Utility Com-
mission requesting the Commission to reform a right of way contract made by
the utility or its predecessor with X, an individual. The contract provided that
the company is to obtain a right of way over X's land for the construction
and maintenance of a gas line or, for that matter, a water line or a telephone line,
depending upon what field of utility service the company is engaged in. In re-
turn for this right of way there is a provision for the payment of a cash sum
by the company, together with an agreement that the company, or its assigns,
will furnish the utility service involved to the dwelling house situated on the
premises. The duration of such service is usually expressed to be as long as the
right of way is used by the company. The utility now wants to put in effect a rate
tariff that will apply to all its customers. Such tariff naturally will be resisted
by X, and, therefore, it will be incumbent upon the utility to go before the
Commision to seek a reformation of the contract. What is the law applicable
to the above situation?
Before this question is answered, a few added variations from the above
hypothetical problem should be disposed of. First, it should be noted that it
is entirely possible that a municipally operated utility may be the party involved
in the dispute with the individual. This being so, then the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission has no jurisdiction, provided further that the dispute is over
the right of way within the municipal limits.' If such be the case, then the
Court of Common Pleas of the county concerned will have jurisdiction over
the action. However, the principles of law controlling the situation will be the
same in either case. Secondly, assuming that this be a public utility and within
the jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commission, suppos e that the right of way
contract was executed prior to 1913, when the original Public Service Commission
was established by the Legislature. It can be stated that this factor is ignored
by the courts and the contract is simply treated as being within the police power
of the State.
The basis of the utility's application for reformation of the contract by
Commission action is that the supplying of utility service of this consumer, X,
under the contract is unduly discriminatory against other consumers and violates
section 304 of the Public Utility Law, which reads that "No public utility shall,
as to rates, make or grant any unreasonable preference or advantage to any person,
corporation, or municipal corporation to any unreasonable prejudice or dis-
advantage.. ."2
1 Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1053, section 301, 66 P.S. 1141.
2 Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. i0m3, art. 3, section 304, 66 P.S. 1144.
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The respondent would contend, on the other hand, that the Public Utility
Commission has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the right of way
contract was a conveyance of an interest in land and thus was not a "contract"
within the meaning of the Public Utility Law giving the Commission power to
vary or reform any obligations or terms of any contract "heretofore or here-
after entered into" between any public utility and any person which concerns
a public right, benefit or privilege.& Respondent would further contend that
any reformation would violate the provision of United States Constitution against
the impairment of the obligations of contract. And lastly, the respondent would
allege that the utility seeks to divest itself of the burden of the contract and
yet retain the benefits by maintaining the utility use over the right of way.
As to X's first argument, the case of Henshaw v. Fayetteville County Gas Co.4
effectively disposes of same when the court says, "As Judge Keller points out
in Wayne Sewerage Co. v. Fromlield, 76 Pa. Super Ct. 491, 'Free use of public
service by certain favored persons cannot be permitted under any form, whether
deed, contract, ordinance, agreement or otherwis'e: Vernon Township v. Public
Service Commission, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 54; Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water
Co., 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 290, as such action is discriminatory. When a rate is once es-
tablished, it applies to all and cannot be departed therefrom." It is clear, there-
fore, that the contention that the contract was for a conveyance of an interest
in land does not remove the dispute from the Commission's jurisdiction. It
should further be noted that in this Henshaw case the agreement was made
in 1896, which was prior to the enactment of the Public Service Act in 1913.
The further contention by the respondent that any reformation would
impair the obligation of contract is stricken down by the case of Scranton Electric
Co. v. Avoca School District8 when the court states that "Contracts for the
service of utilities are presumed to have been made subject to the police power of
the State (Leiper v. 'Baltimore & Philadelphia R. Co. et al., 262 Pa. 328, 105
A. 551; Scranton V. P.S.C. et al., 268 Pa. 192, 110 A. 775; Suburban Water Co.
v. Oakmont Borough, 268 Pa. 253, 110 A. 778), and it is beyond the power of
the contracting parties to fix or provide for service permanently. Plaintiff's es-
tablished rates apply to defendant the same as to other consumers notwithstanding
the existence of any contract providing for a different rate or for free service.
Henshaw v. Fayette County Gas Co., 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 564, 161 A. 896.
The principle has been definitely and repeatedly stated. The Public Service
Company Law and the Public Utility Law supplant any agreement in so far
as rates are involved between the consumer and the utility. The change of a rate
by the sovereign power of the Commonwealth, fixed by contract for the perform-
ante of service by a public utility company, does not impair the obligation of
3 Section 920 suPra.
4 10o5 Pa. Super. 564, 161 A. 896 (1932).
5 153 Pa. Super. 270, 37 A.2d 725 (1944).
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contract under the Constitution of the United States. 'The contract is simply
modified or reformed so as to include for the time being the new rate fixed
by law': Suburban Water Co. v. Oakmont Borough, supra, 268 Pa. 243, at
page 254, 110 A. 778 at page 782." The Suburban Water Co. case cited above
further says "There is, however, no impairment of the obligation, but merely a
fixing of the rate to be charged for the service, which rate could only be legally
fixed by the parties so long as it was not fixed by the sovereign power of the
Commonwealth, and the parties are presumed to have included this provision
in their contract."
Finally, with regard to the contention that the utility seeks to retain the
benefits of the contract but not the burden, this argument must likewise fail in the
light of the Public Utility Law and the decisions cited herein. And, in any
respect the consideration for a right of way granted many years previously with
the free use of the utility service up until the present time, when brought down
to a dollars and cents value, would in all justice refute any argument that X has
not been dealt with fairly.
In the light of the above discussion the question arises as to what advice
an attorney should give a client whose land contains gas deposits and who,
in addition to the royalties, desires the company to furnish his dwelling with
gas. It is clear that any free service will be held to be discriminatory. To avoid
this result, the landowner should except from the grant an amount to satisfy his
requirements from the gas granted to the company.
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